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Confronting the Holocaust: questioning humanity and facing insurmountable 
challenges   
In late 1944 and early 1945 the British Foreign Office gave British soldiers a pocket 
guide to prepare them to conquer Germany and occupy it afterwards. The guide 
argued that Hitler had exploited Germany’s tradition of authority and glorification of 
war, and had moulded a new generation of brutal killers. The Germans, the guide 
concluded, differed sharply from the British people: ‘The likeness, if it exists at all, is 
only skin-deep. THE DEEPER YOU DIG INTO THE GERMAN CHARACTER, 
THE MORE YOU REALISE HOW DIFFERENT THEY ARE FROM US.’1  
In the end, however, nobody seemed prepared for the horrors discovered by 
Allied soldiers.  The depth and extent of what humans had suffered under the Nazi 
dictatorship questioned the core of humanity and posed serious challenges. Whilst it 
seemed imperative to tell what happened, to learn from it, to punish the perpetrators, 
and to explain why it happened, it emerged quickly that this was far from an easy 
task. It seemed obvious that the barbaric crimes called for a new departure in 
identifying and punishing those responsible. The Allied powers agreed that ‘German 
militarism and Nazism will be wiped out’ (Potsdam, August 1945) and publicly called 
for retribution for the crimes – at the time it was estimated that there were hundreds of 
thousands of perpetrators – set up military tribunals, and targeted ‘German officers 
and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken 
a consenting part’ in atrocities, war crimes and crimes against humanity.2 However, in 
the western occupied zones the coming of the Cold War led to a dramatic 
transformation from a punitive approach to focusing on reconstructing a capitalist 
economic system with the help of the old elites. Whilst in the Soviet zone de-
Nazification is often regarded as more successful – it was quicker and more rigorous – 
the Communists used the situation to carry out a general purge against everyone who 
opposed them, made compromises with former Nazis to stabilise the dictatorial rule, 
and pretended that the restructuring of their society had ‘liberated’ East Germany 
from Nazi oppression. 
Finally, explanations about the relationship between Germans, Nazism and acts 
against humanity varied and proved to be far from straightforward. Whilst the British 
troops were taught that Germans had been shaped by sinister traditions and an evil 
dictator, direct contact with Germans suggested a more complex picture. Three years 
after the end of the Second World War the US psychologist H. L. Ansbacher 
published a study based on surveys of German POWs. When trying to explain why 
Germans had supported Nazism, and why, even after its defeat and after the 
‘discovery’ of its horrific nature, half of the German population continued to believe 
that ‘National Socialism was a good idea only badly carried out’, Ansbacher 
concluded: 
 
What did the respondents mean by the ‘idea’ of National Socialism and the way 
in which it was carried out? Did they mean the idea of the master race, 
compulsions, aggression, and did they mean that this idea was not carried out 
with sufficient consistency? If this were the case, the German mind would 
indeed be a most perplexing problem and cause for alarm. Our results lead us to 
the strong belief that when half the Germans today assert the idea of National 
Socialism was good, but badly carried out, they mean primarily the idea of 
social and economic betterments, and find fault with its realization through 
oppression, aggression, and persecution. In this event the problem of the 
German mind is much less puzzling. No change of basic motives and goals is 
needed, only a more complete understanding on the part of the Germans of the 
real meaning of National Socialism, namely, that its vicious aspects were 
inseparably intertwined with its more constructive sides.3 
 
The discourse about perpetrators of the Holocaust until the 1980s: suppression 
and denial in perpetrator societies and societies with collaborators – the stigma 
of pathological killers – the paradigm of a ‘mechanised’ crime   
The Nazi racial Dictatorship was the most genocidal regime the world has ever seen. 
It is often forgotten that around 3 million Poles, 7 million Soviet civilians, and 3.3 
million Soviet POWs were murdered because they were regarded Slavic ‘sub-
humans’. The sociology of its perpetrators, who killed approximately 20 million 
unarmed people, occupies a central place in the study of the Holocaust and has a 
contemporary meaning.4 How many people took part in the mass murder? What kind 
of people were they? What were their reasons for their murderous activities? And 
what were the consequences of their deeds? Some of these perpetrators still live with 
us or are known to us as family friends or acquaintances, fathers or mothers, uncles or 
aunts, grandfathers or grandmothers. These questions also deal with the uncertainty 
whether the mass murder of the Jews was a singular historic event, or, because 
potentially it may be rooted in the nature of humans, it can be repeated.  
There have been sharply contrasting interpretations whether and how these 
issues have been addressed in Germany.5 Did German society suppress the past and 
conserve deep-rooted anti-democratic tendencies underneath the surface? 
Alternatively, did it readily engage with the Nazi past and transform into a vibrant 
democracy? Or, do these issues require differentiated answers that reflect failures, 
shortcomings as well as success? Thomas Kühne is in no doubt that the Nazi past was 
always present in the public life of Germany. However, he is also quick to point out 
that one has to distinguish carefully what aspects of the Nazi period and its aftermath 
were discussed, in what manner, with what objectives and to what effect within both 
German states, during the various periods of their history and by what groups, classes, 
generations, professions, confessions, and political camps, and by which gender.  
In countries that were dominated by Nazi Germany the discourse about the war 
focused on a small number of well-known agents of Nazi rule, the trauma suffered 
under Nazi occupation (Austria complained of having been the first victim of Nazi 
aggression), resistance (France, Poland), partisan warfare (Yugoslavia), or the ‘great 
war of the fatherland’ (Soviet Union) – all of which served as tools to integrate and 
legitimise their respective post-war societies. The painful and divisive issue of 
widespread collaboration, a crucial component of how the occupiers were able to 
establish their rule, and the role of local agents in the persecution of the Jews and 
other minorities, was swept under the carpet and received little attention.6 
Additionally, research on the Holocaust in the Eastern Bloc was strongly ideologized 
before it became more or less insignificant.7 
Considering the continuity in personnel in more or less all sectors of West 
German society after the defeat of the ‘Third Reich’ and the fact that many Germans 
had been perpetrators, accomplices or bystanders, it cannot be a surprise that most 
Germans were not keen on dealing with the topic of perpetrators, and kept secret or 
minimized the crimes of the past.8 More than anything else, the Nuremberg Trials of 
War Crimes shaped the way in which perpetrators were dealt with and the discourses 
on perpetrators and memory in West Germany in the post-war period. Following the 
debates concerning the responsibilities for the crimes, only the Gestapo and the SS 
were classified as ‘criminal organisations’ whilst regular police, plainclothes police 
and the Wehrmacht successfully escaped the mantra of guilt: whilst Himmler’s black 
corps was demonized, it isolated the crime institutionally and allowed large parts of 
the population to exonerate themselves from any guilt (according to Gerald Reitlinger, 
the SS became the ‘alibi of a nation’9). Even Eugen Kogon, a Holocaust survivor and 
one who was highly critical of the way how most Germans denied any guilt, in his 
influential book The SS-State (the German edition had been published in 1947) 
described Hitler and his SS-henchmen as failed characters who suffered from 
inferiority complexes and were in ‘naked pursuit of power’: 
 
What we are dealing with here are not baffling mysteries of human nature, but 
violations of simple, basic, psychological laws in the evolution of inferior 
minds. It was inferiority – whether of minds, reason, willpower, imagination or 
the numerous social aspects of the human mind – that led these men into the 
SS.10  
 
Other important developments also shaped collective perceptions and the specific 
discourse on perpetrators. Otto Ohlendorf, the leader of Einsatzgruppe D, claimed 
during the Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg that the murder of Jews was based on a 
clear order from Hitler (i.e., that there was a central plan for the Final Solution) and 
therefore amounted to following ‘Führer orders’:  
 
BABEL [defence lawyer]: But did you have no scruples in regard to the 
execution of these orders? 
OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.  
BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these scruples? 
OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader 
should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state … 
HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the 
execution of these orders? 
OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court martial with a 
corresponding sentence.11 
 
This line of argument reduced perpetrators to mere executioners of an alien will 
steered by Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich (who were all dead but were treated as 
principal offenders) and emphasised that any resistance would have had deadly 
consequences. This defence strategy quickly became commonplace and helped many 
accused to go unpunished especially after 1949 when German courts judged the 
overwhelming majority of killers as ‘assisting’ in murders which they as individuals 
apparently did not want.12 This interpretation turned the bearers of terror into victims 
of terror – i.e. ordinary Germans were prisoners of a specific historical period and 
structures and were condemned to obedience.13  
The representation of female perpetrators and their defence strategy in various Nazi 
trials is a largely neglected topic but played an important part of the collective 
strategy of denying any guilt.14 Accused women exploited their gender status by 
arguing that they had been exploited and had acted in subordinate positions as 
helpless assistants in a regime that was led by men. Furthermore, analyses of 
‘courtroom-culture’ and media representation of trials show that female perpetrators 
were stereotyped and demonized as complete deviations from femininity and 
exceptional ‘female brutes’, e.g., Ilse Koch, ‘the witch from Buchenwald’, Carmen 
Maria Mory, ‘the devil’ of Ravensbrück, or Herta Oberheuser, ‘the sadist [doctor; 
CCWS] of Ravensbrück’. This discourse disguised the participation of a large number 
of women in Nazi crimes, and served to avoid a critical self-reflection of the past. In 
short, the picture of ‘unnatural femininity’ and dehumanised creatures with unbridled 
sexuality allowed society to construct a counter-model of itself as normal and 
innocent.  
In the late 1940s and early 1950s there was no complete repression or denying 
of responsibilities for the crimes committed in the name of the German people in 
Germany. However, Germans practised what Robert Moeller described as ‘selective 
memories’. In Germany the discourse focused not on the horrors the Jews had 
suffered under the Nazis, but on German victimization and Soviet barbarism, i.e. 
crimes committed against German expellees and POWs.15 Futhermore, according to 
Ulrich Herbert, public perception  
 
made connections with images of the liberation of the concentration camps 
Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, or Dachau – and not with the mass shootings in 
Riga or the mass gassings in Auschwitz. In this way, the process of mass 
murder was construed as a series of secret events that occurred in specially 
cordoned-off zones in ‘the east’ to which no witnesses were granted access.16   
 
Perpetrator historiography uncritically followed the interpretation that blame and 
responsibility for the Holocaust lay with a few top Nazi leaders, in particular Hitler. 
The Führer was portrayed as a crazy, irrational and opportunistic demagogue, who 
ordered the final solution.17 It took decades until some historians engaged more 
analytically with Hitler only to discover that he had a ‘cohesive world view’.18 The 
focus, however, remained on questions of order and timing – Was there a Führer 
order to the ‘Final Solution’? Did Hitler decide on the mass murder of the Jews in the 
1920s? When exactly was the decision made to kill all Jews? – all of which are 
important issues but ultimately do not address key humanitarian and moral questions 
raised by the Holocaust. The spotlight on Hitler simplified the dynamics and 
complexities of Nazism, and the notion of an ‘evil monster’ diverted attention from 
the responsibilities of others. 
A number of high-profile court-cases from the late 1950s ‘broke the general 
silence about the perpetrators’ and ignited debates about the mass crimes committed 
under Nazism, most importantly: the Einsatzgruppen trial in Ulm in 1958, the 
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961, and the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt in the mid-
1960s. A new generation of historians, whose well-known publication Anatomie des 
SS-Staates was expert evidence prepared for and in part delivered at the trial of war 
criminals in Frankfurt and was published by the Institute for Contemporary History in 
Munich, provided solid ‘analyses of the motives, structure, and methods of the leaders 
of the National Socialist regime’.19  
Overall, however, Holocaust research at West German universities remained a 
marginal topic until the late 1980s. Instead, historians were preoccupied with 
searching for the background to why the Nazis came to power, and the turn to 
structural history in West German historiography meant that debates centred on 
system theory. This was an era when the concept of  ‘totalitarianism’ blossomed 
(vilifying the socialist dictatorships as equivalent to National Socialism during the 
Cold War), and when historians were locked into a bitter stalemate between 
‘intentionalists’ and ‘structuralists’. Peter Longerich recently highlighted the narrow-
mindedness of a debate in which apparent contrasts were, in fact, mutually conditional 
and reflected multi-layered and complex phenomena that cannot be grasped with one-
dimensional explanations: humans who want to carry out mass murder depend on 
structures, whilst structures do not function on their own but need humans; regional 
initiatives were an integral part of centrally controlled policies; pragmatic 
explanations for the persecution of Jews were backed up by ideological justifications 
and vice versa.20 
As it stood, influential books by Karl Dietrich Bracher focused on the 
intellectual origins and the organisational development of the Nazi dictatorship, and 
perpetrators did not feature in prominent anthologies about the Nazi dictatorship or 
the massive ‘Bavaria Project’ of the Institute for Contemporary History.21 Notable 
exceptions in the 1970s were two studies that went largely unnoticed: Uwe Dietrich 
Adam investigated the coordination of various national institutions in the persecution 
of the Jews and was the first German historian who questioned the linear development 
that ended in genocide, and Christian Streit highlighted the central role of the 
Wehrmacht in the death of some 57% of Soviet POWs.22 Although the knowledge of 
the killing process was at best rudimentary, German scholarship largely ignored 
international developments in the field,23 and the huge amount of rich material that 
had been generated by prosecutors in criminal proceedings against Nazi criminals. 
After all, the historical professions had played a crucial role in legitimising German 
claims to the East, the Nazi programme of ethnic cleansing and the genocide against 
European Jews. When, after 1945, the same historians and then their protégés 
continued to hold chairs at German universities, it made sense for them to pretend to 
be ‘emotionally detached and “neutral” in [their] approach.’24 It was indicative that a 
rare study based on court material by the criminologist Herbert Jäger in the late 1960s 
was largely ignored by historians although it was highly innovative on several 
accounts.25 It demolished the perpetrators’ principal line of defence that they had 
acted under binding orders: Jäger could not find a single case in which someone who 
did not obey criminal orders was physically harmed. The book also emphasised the 
link between the war and genocide, and presented an important contribution about the 
individual motivation of Nazi perpetrators, a topic that other psychologists and 
criminologists had previously tackled but with little conviction. Jäger suggested a new 
typology that distinguished between excess crimes (crimes committed on one’s own 
initiative and in disinhibitory conditions), crimes committed in a relative autonomous 
way, and crimes committed by following orders. Furthermore, some Holocaust 
survivors and critical authors responded to the horrors that were exposed by the court 
cases, the mild sentencing of mass murderers and the repression of the Nazi past: 
autobiographical accounts by Jean Améry and Primo Levi, or theatre plays by Rolf 
Hochhuth (‘The Deputy’) and Peter Weiss (‘The Investigation’) reached a mass 
audience.26  
Meanwhile, highly influential non-German books on the Holocaust – e.g., 
works by Lucy Dawidowicz and Nora Levin that were largely based on secondary 
sources and put forward simplistic explanations which Raul Hilberg described bitterly 
as examples of ‘manipulation in history’27 – perpetuated the notion of evil leaders and 
popular irrational anti-Semitism.28 There were, however, also scholars who produced 
outstanding and original scholarship that improved our understanding of the 
systematic mass murder of the Jews. The works of two scholars stood out. The 
philosopher Hannah Arendt was a leading voice amongst German-Austrian Jews and 
Holocaust survivors. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) she attempted to 
explain why the relatively unimportant phenomena of the Jewish question and anti-
Semitism became the catalytic agent leading to the rise and success of Nazism, a 
world war and finally the crime of genocide.29 Her explanation suggested the 
emergence of the new form of totalitarian rule that was built upon irrational terror and 
ideological fiction. To Arendt, totalitarian regimes were capable of mobilising 
populations where a viable public life with conditions of liberty and freedom had been 
uprooted by devastating developments in the modern period (industrialisation, 
population movements, modern warfare, revolutionary upheaval, etc.). According to 
Arendt, ‘absolute evil’ emerged in totalitarian societies – ‘absolute because it can no 
longer be deduced from humanly comprehensible motives’. In the process, anti-
Semitism and other motivating factors disappeared behind the ‘inherent logicality’ of 
mass murder. Terror became an end in itself to ‘stabilise’ men and formed the essence 
of totalitarian domination.30  
Arendt’s thesis that the annihilation of the Jews followed some kind of inner 
logic broadened the scope of perpetrators to encompass all of German society, and 
influenced generations of historians. Hilberg’s seminal work The Destruction of the 
European Jews from 1961 exploited a massive body of empirical evidence and 
interpreted the Shoah as a process of successive steps that were initiated by countless 
decision-makers inside a vast bureaucratic apparatus that was operating and co-
ordinating on an unprecedented scale.31 This bureaucratic machinery was driven by a 
shared comprehension, synchronisation and efficiency, and was not limited by any 
morals because the process was dehumanised (e.g., the Commandant of Treblinka and 
Sobibor, Franz Stangel, described the Jews as ‘cargo’). According to Christopher 
Browning, Hilberg’s great contribution was to portray an extensive ‘machinery of 
destruction’ that ‘was structurally no different from organized German society as a 
whole.’ Indeed, ‘the machinery of destruction was the organized community in one of 
its specialized roles.’ Moreover, these bureaucrats ‘were not merely passive recipients 
of orders from above’ but ‘innovators and problem solvers’.32 However, Hilberg’s 
overall focus on the bureaucratic process and the structure of extermination, 
emphasising the division of labour in the killing process, meant that there was still no 
detailed focus on the background and motivation of perpetrators. In other words, 
whilst Hilberg had put the perpetrator at the centre of his analysis and emphasised the 
involvement of a large number of groups in the killing process, his focus was on the 
role of perpetrators as members of an institution rather than as individuals.33  
The 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann boosted discussions on the Holocaust.34 The 
trial is often associated with Hannah Arendt’s famous book Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
A Report on the Banality of Evil. Arendt was clearly influenced by Hilberg’s study 
and depicted the Shoah as a modern, bureaucratically-organised and industrially-
driven extermination process in which Eichmann was merely a mechanical link. Her 
description of Eichmann’s actions as ‘banal’ was meant to challenge the prevalent 
notion that the mass murder was carried out by a limited number of pathological 
killers and outsiders. To Arendt, Eichmann appeared very ordinary, but, like most 
other Germans, ‘had succumbed to Hitler’ and was therefore afflicted by an ‘inability 
to think’. With this, ‘the moral maxims which determine social behaviour and the 
religious commandments – “Though shalt not kill!” – which guide conscience had 
virtually vanished’. Eichmann was not determined by ‘fanaticism’ or violent anti-
Semitism, but by his ‘extraordinary loyalty to Hitler and the Führer’s order’. 35 
Gerhard Paul argued that this paradigm of the ‘mechanized’ crime has been the 
central explanation for the Shoah until today.36 Martin Broszat, who in 1958 
published the autobiographical notes of Rudolf Höβ, commandant of Auschwitz, 
described an executioner who appeared to be a normal petit-bourgeois human who 
zealously and unemotionally obeyed orders from authorities and was part of a factory-
like and anonymous mass murder. This new picture of perpetrators entailed that they 
were not particularly evil, but orderly, conscientious, and thus appeared extremely 
suitable to take part in the anonymous mechanism of modern mass murder. A flood of 
publications described Eichmann’s mediocre normality and depicted him as model 
example of the loyal bureaucrat – a cog in a machine that operated beyond his control 
– hence the description ‘banal bureaucrat’ and ‘bureaucratic murderer’.  
Authors from Israel in particular criticised Arendt’s assessment that in the modern 
world all humans are potential Eichmann’s and are not aware of the consequences of 
their actions. To some, this minimises the horrific crimes that were committed and 
gives them a universal character. To others, like Raul Hilberg, ‘there was no 
“banality” in this “evil”’ as Eichmann was not only a loyal bureaucrat but rather a 
trailblazer for continuously finding new ways in achieving the incredible dimension 
of his barbaric deed. Finally, Alf Lüdtke warned that by describing automatic 
processes without humans one re-affirms a widespread consensus amongst the 
perpetrator society that denied that each killing had to be carried out again and again 
by the will and action of the perpetrators.37 Not surprisingly, Ulrich Herbert described 
this period as ‘the second suppression of the past’ in Germany.38 Gerhard Paul argued 
that the Shoah turned into an ‘automatism without people’ that ‘found its description 
in the metaphor of the “factory of death”’: Auschwitz. This discourse did not deal 
with the activities of killers in shooting pits or the liquidations of ghettos, and enabled 
‘normal’ Germans once more to distance themselves from the perpetrators.39    
There was, to be true, a widespread trend to conceptualise the Holocaust. 
Marxist scholars in the GDR continued to describe fascism as the most imperialist 
element of finance capital. Theodor Adorno argued that the support for fascism, anti-
democracy and anti-Semitism in the inter-war period was caused by the appearance of 
an ‘authoritarian personality’. And the Jewish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in his 
book Modernity and the Holocaust proposed ‘to treat the Holocaust as a rare, yet 
significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society’.40 
However, change was on the way and approaches and methodologies diversified 
especially in German historiography in the course of the 1980s (there is no room here 
to discuss the growing attention amongst the American public to the Holocaust from 
the mid-1970s41). Several factors help to explain this. The airing of the fictional 
television series Holocaust in 1979 had a significant impact in West Germany and, 
according to Judith Doneson, broke ‘a thirty-five-year taboo on discussing Nazi 
atrocities’, whilst Federal President Richard von Weizäcker’s groundbreaking speech 
on 8 May 1985, which ‘placed Jews, Poles and Russians higher up the list of victims 
than the German themselves’, indicated change at the highest political level.42 The 
turn towards local history and the history of everyday life meant that coming to terms 
with one’s past took place in real terms, including a growing awareness of the places 
of crimes and the perspective of victims – albeit the aspect of perpetrators continued 
to be neglected for a long time.43 Furthermore, increasing research on the ‘Third 
Reich’ heightened the awareness about the enormous gaps in the knowledge about the 
Holocaust – and German scholarship re-joined an international debate on the topic. 
Moreover, critics who have attacked ‘functionalists’ in particular for depersonalizing 
the Holocaust, have often not recognised that historians such as Hans Mommsen and 
Martin Broszat drew attention away from the Nazi leadership ‘towards different 
functional elites in the bureaucracy, military and judiciary, their interaction and, 
ultimately, towards German society at large.’44 Hence, the racial activities of institutes 
and social groups beyond the SS attracted some attention. The policies against the 
Jews appeared more and more as the core of a comprehensive policy of extermination 
that unleashed its destructive features during the war and that involved the 
participation of all key institutions of the ‘Third Reich’ and targeted a growing 
number of victims: Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm presented a detailed description of the 
murderous activities of Einsatzgruppen in Belarus and the Baltic nations in the 
context of early occupation policies; Ernst Klee, a social worker for the handicapped, 
produced a major study of the Nazi ‘euthanasia’ killing (in which around 250,000 
people were murdered); the geneticist Benno Müller-Hill revealed the involvement of 
German geneticists and anthropologists in the selection of Jews, Gypsies, the mentally 
ill and the retarded, for sterilization and genocide; Gisela Bock published an 
important study about forced sterilization (between 320,000 and 350,000 people were 
sterilised in accordance with Nazi racial criteria); Hans-Walter Schmuhl explored the 
concept of racial hygiene and the euthanasia killing; Ulrich Herbert looked at the war 
economy, the exploitation of foreign slave workers (around 7.7 million foreign men 
and women were forced to work in Nazi Germany by autumn 1944), and the role of 
employers; and Burkhard Jellonek studied the treatment of homosexuals.45 Many new 
impulses came from ‘outside’ the mainstream German scholarship, including non-
historians, who turned to empirical studies of everyday life and mentalities, published 
sources about the actual killing process, and discovered the importance of letters from 
the front.46   
These original studies on organisational, ideological, regional and biographical 
aspects of Nazism led to a much better understanding of the Nazis’ policies of 
extermination and the role and motivation of perpetrators. For instance, Michael 
Zimmermann demonstrated that the Nazi policy of persecution against the Romani 
‘drew on traditional anti-Gypsy prejudices, but managed to radicalize them at decisive 
points by representing them as scientifically sound with the aid of social and 
biological theories.’ There was ‘no evidence of a unified process of decision-making 
… nor of a corresponding chain of command for the murder of “Gypsies”’ (more than 
200,000 Gypsies were killed in the Holocaust).47 Meanwhile, researchers abroad were 
also producing innovative studies.48 One notable pioneer was the US-Israeli historian 
Omer Bartov with his investigation of the unprecedented brutalities committed by the 
German Wehrmacht in the East. Bartov challenged the post-1945 memories of loyal 
and self-sacrificing German soldiers who were victims first of the Nazi regime, then 
of partisan terror, and then of Stalin’s military aggression and captivity. He explained 
the murderous activities of soldiers, from top ranking officers to foot soldiers, with a 
combination of ‘the terrible physical and mental hardship at the front’, the draconian 
military system of repression and, most crucial, ‘ideological conviction’ and ‘a 
general and widespread support [for], if not “belief”, in Hitler’.49  
 
‘Perpetrator studies’ since the 1990s: locating ‘ordinary’ men and women as 
mass murderers – confronting motives and actions of killers – acknowledging 
victims   
The 1990s proved to be the decade when mainstream scholarship and the public in 
Germany were ready to confront the National Socialist past head-on for the first time 
and debate it as never before. Bill Niven argued that ‘the time was right’ not only 
because of special anniversaries (e.g., the 50th anniversaries of Stauffenberg’s attempt 
on Hitler’s life and the end of the war) and spectacular media events (e.g., Steven 
Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List in 1993), but, more importantly, because German 
unification brought an awareness and acceptance of a common past. Furthermore, the 
crucial impact of generational shifts, particularly in the 1960s and again the 1980s, 
explained why ‘the 1990s where a continuation and radicalization of a process of 
coming to terms with the past, rather than its first phase.’50 Scholarship and the wider 
public realm were now ready to confront what stood at the heart of the Nazi 
dictatorship and the Holocaust: war, genocide, perpetrators and crime scenes, the 
precise implication of every group in society in mass murder, and, of course, the 
victims. One could argue that the opening of the massive Memorial to the Murdered 
Jews of Europe in the centre of Berlin in 2005 has finally shifted the fate of the 
victims of Nazism right into the heart of German society.    
A real break-through in scholarship was Christopher Browning’s exemplary 
micro-analysis from 1992 of around 500 members of Police Battalion 101, a unit 
comprising middle-aged reservists from a working-class or petit-bourgeois 
background in Hamburg.51 Most of the men were not fanatical Nazis, but took part in 
the Holocaust in Poland and shot at least 38,000 Jews. Browning’s focus on the 
murderous activities and motivation of these ‘ordinary men’ – the great majority of 
them became executioners although they had the possibility of not  participating in 
these mass shootings – put this key issue at the top of the scholarly agenda for the first 
time. The US scholar based his research on court proceedings from the 1960s and, 
favouring a multi-causal, anthropological approach, argued that the behaviour of these 
men was determined by a combination of factors: a willingness to obey orders and 
authority, group conformity and peer pressure, career-mindedness, the brutalising 
effects of a racist imperialist war, and the insidious effects of constant propaganda and 
indoctrination. Anti-Semitism, according to Browning, played only a minor role. 
Browning’s complex conclusion was influenced by the Milgram and Stanford prison 
experiments and emphasised how social group processes create specific conditions 
which can have a de-inhibiting effect, potentially turning ‘ordinary men’ into brutal 
murderers.52 To Browning, the genocide against the Jews was a unique consequence 
of the potential for destruction in the modern age. He also emphasised that the Shoah 
should not be seen as the execution of a central decision to exterminate but as a 
process in which local initiatives played a crucial role (pioneering work about the 
Holocaust in the occupied territories – e.g. in the Lublin district, Belarus and Galicia – 
have meanwhile confirmed this53). Furthermore, with reference to Primo Levi he 
asked scholars to pay more attention to complex and contradictory aspects of human 
behaviour, i.e. the ‘Gray Zone’ of victims (e.g., the corruption and collaboration that 
flourished in the camps) and perpetrators (e.g., ‘the pathetic figure’ of commander 
Trapp, ‘who sent his men to slaughter Jews “weeping like a child”’).54 
The controversy surrounding the ‘Crimes of the Wehrmacht’ exhibition and the 
‘Goldhagen debate’ sparked off a massive public discussion about perpetrators. 
Suddenly the spotlight was on locating killers and their motives at the heart of society, 
and the brutal suffering of victims. The public was confronted with the accusation that 
‘ordinary’ Germans participated in systematic mass murder (previously, similar 
findings had not received much public reaction). The breaking of the ‘visual taboo’ 
regarding the Shoah made this situation even more dramatic. Whilst Goldhagen 
described the barbaric killings in graphic detail and used photos as source – e.g. how 
an ‘ordinary’ German soldier ‘takes aim at a Jewish mother and child during the 
slaughter of the Jews of Ivangorod, Ukraine, in 1942’ – the exhibition displayed 
photos, letters and documents of ‘ordinary’ soldiers taking part in the widespread 
mass-murder of civilians and Soviet POWs.55 Suddenly perpetrators and bystanders 
of the crimes were not anonymous any more but identifiable individuals, sometimes 
neighbours, relatives or even one’s own father. The ‘Wehrmacht’ exhibition in 
particular sparked off an unprecedented public response because it challenged a 
collective memory and ‘one of the founding myths of the German Federal Republic – 
the legend of a “decent” army that had steered clear of atrocities perpetrated by the 
SS.’56  
Whilst the Wehrmacht exhibition was largely concerned with setting the record 
straight, Goldhagen’s aim was to explain the motivation of ‘ordinary’ killers. Like 
Browning, he dismissed the thesis that perpetrators were exceptional pathological 
killers and that the Shoah was an abstract industrial Genocide. Instead, both 
emphasised that it was a mass murder carried out by a large number of individual 
perpetrators. In particular, Goldhagen stressed that each individual is an autonomous 
being and responsible for his/her actions, and also possesses freedom to make 
decisions about whether or not to participate in actions that violate human morals.57 
But whilst Goldhagen analysed the same sources as Browning (witness statements in 
the court case against members of Police Battalion 101), he came to strikingly 
different conclusions: he saw the Shoah rooted in Germany’s specific political and 
cultural development and argued that ‘ordinary’ Germans became ‘Hitler’s willing 
executioners’ because of a deep-seated ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’.  
At a time when empirical research suggested the complex multi-causal nature of 
the Holocaust, Goldhagen was turning the clock back to simplistic interpretations. 
However, the debate that was sparked off by Goldhagen’s probing questions and 
provocative theses exposed serious deficiencies in our knowledge about key aspects 
of the Holocaust, and led to the acceptance that a change of paradigm, already started 
by Browning, was essential. This included shifting the focus from the Nazi elite to 
‘ordinary Germans’ as killers; a cultural anthropological approach that incorporates a 
detailed analysis of the crimes and responsibilities of individual perpetrators; and an 
attempt to situate the crimes in the context of the wider society. Furthermore, it 
became clear how little was known about the precise extent, form and role of anti-
Semitism and its link with the Holocaust, and how this virulent German anti-Semitism 
compared to other forms of this phenomenon.58  
One final contributor who deserves singling out for making a whole range of 
original and challenging contributions to the then newly-emerging subject of 
Perpetrator Studies (Täterforschung) was the Berlin historian Götz Aly. Aly, in 
tandem with Susanne Heim, argued in the early 1990s that there was a ‘political 
economy of the Final Solution’ – i.e. young planners identified overpopulation as the 
source of a deep-rooted structural problem of the region and aimed to spark off a 
revival and modernisation of the economy by destroying the socio-economic 
existence of Polish Jews.59 Whilst this thesis did not convince many fellow experts – 
it is difficult to prove the impact of these ideas on policy, and one striking feature of 
the Holocaust seemed to be precisely the irrelevance of economic criteria – Aly and 
Heim challenged mainstream scholarship: they proved that those responsible for the 
extermination policy were not restricted to the SS and the Nazi party, and they insisted 
that the Holocaust was not motivated by irrational racial hatred but primarily 
‘utilitarian goals’. Aly, Heim and a whole group of like-minded scholars who 
published books on the role played by young, well-trained experts such as 
statisticians, economists, doctors and historians, saw Nazism as providing them with a 
unique opportunity to realise their shared visions of a rationalised social and 
economic utopia. 
In the mid-1990s Aly’s book Final Solution provided empirical basis for the 
amended thesis that the policies against the Jews became radicalised due to the failure 
of plans for the deportation of the Jews.60 However, as Herbert points out, whilst Nazi 
deportation plans ‘also involved Poles, Russians, even entire populations of countries 
lying to Germany’s east’, their failure only led to the practice of genocide against the 
Jews. This raised fundamental questions:    
 
What role then did anti-Semitism play here? In what way did the dilemmas – 
real or contrived – arising in specific situations link up with long-standing 
attitudes and aims? What was the relationship between ideological factors, such 
as racism and hatred of Jews, to goal-oriented, ‘rational’ motives, such as 
economic modernization or dealing with food scarcity? How did the motives – 
both individual and situationally determined – of the murderers and those who 
bore responsibility for their actions relate to a general dynamic of violence 
directed against Jews?61 
 
After Browning, Goldhagen and Aly had thrown down the gauntlet to their peers, 
perpetrator studies became a ‘boom’ subject amongst a new generation of historians 
who exploited the newly available documents in the former Eastern Block states. The 
new interest in people and protagonists led to a turn towards the history of mentalities 
(Mentalitätsgeschichte) and biographical studies, an emphasis on detailed empirical 
research, a focus on comparative typologies and motivations of perpetrators, and the 
exploration of the decentralised perspective of the policies of extermination in the 
occupied territories.62   
The core group of perpetrators near the top of the Nazi hierarchy, the men who 
bore responsibility for the organization of the mass murders, emerged as an 
‘ideological elite’. For instance, the leadership of the Reich Security Head Office 
(RSHA; maybe the most central group of planner-perpetrators) were born after the 
turn of the century in the middle and upper strata of German society, were radicalised 
by war and post-war crisis, and were influenced by völkisch racism, enthusiasm for 
technology and ideas of a ‘heroic realism’ (term referring to murderous actions not 
being based on hatred but on rationality, i.e. killing did not spark off empathy as it 
served the interest of the Volk).63 These educated members of the core group of 
perpetrators, like the key official in Heydrich’s security police apparatus, Werner 
Best, or Götz Aly’s ‘ethnic planners’, camp commandants, Gestapo chiefs, 
Einsatzgruppen commanders, Sipo and SD, SS and police leaders, ‘Jewish experts’, 
and T-4 killers, were technically efficient and well-trained professionals. But whilst 
each group had their own ‘generational, social, and/or professional homogeneity’, 
they were all willing and committed ideologues who exploited their considerable 
autonomy to pursue their vision of a racist world order (‘ideological bureaucracy’).64 
This ideal was worth any sacrifice and transcended any traditional limits. Ideological 
commitment, although it was complex and varied, played a crucial dual function 
amongst the core group of perpetrators: it served as motivation for individuals and 
provided a focus of orientation for a variety of competing interests. This helps to 
explain the smoothly functioning division of labour and the ‘networks of Nazi 
persecution’ that coordinated genocide in a polycratic environment.65    
The more recent research has increasingly focused on the ‘shooters’ – the rank-
and-file Einsatzkommandos, Reserve Police, Waffen-SS, and Wehrmacht – who were 
composed mainly of a cross-section of German-Austrian society. Members of these 
vast groups had no typology: ‘no age, gender, social, educational, ethnic, or religious 
cohort proved immune to involvement’.66 But whilst individuals had different 
biographical patterns and showed individual forms of behaviours, like members of 
Einsatzgruppe D who carried out mass killings in the south of the Soviet Union, their 
murderous impact was frighteningly homogenous.67 Two interpretations about the 
dramatic transformation from upright burgher to brutal killer seem worth mentioning. 
Klaus-Michael Mallmann dismisses the common explanation such as obedience to 
orders, the brutalisation of war and the impact of propaganda because these 
murderous shooters had volunteered and there was no time to get used to violence and 
to be affected by propaganda. Instead, he argues that the radicalisation of the anxiety 
and hatred of ‘Jewish Bolshevism’, a sentiment that had gradually grown since 1917, 
became virtual reality when confronted with ‘alien’ Jews in enemy territory and 
legitimised ‘the removal of a collective security risk as necessary self-defence.’68 
Whilst there is a growing body of research on perpetrators from the Wehrmacht, 
Thomas Kühne has recently provided the first comprehensive explanation of what 
turned ‘ordinary’ soldiers into murderers, why these soldiers fought so long in a war 
that was lost, and what explains the way how soldiers communicated their 
experiences after 1945.69 At the heart of his explanation stands the concept of 
comradeship which was central to everyday social practices of the military 
community and its moral rules – and which entailed enormous pressures to conform. 
It included the shared experience of being away from home, being accomplice in 
murder and then belonging to the ‘community of suffering’ when the war turned 
against Germany. Soldierly comradeship was the epitome of everything ‘good’. 
Kühne concludes: ‘The “human” side of comradeship made the ‘inhumane’ side of 
war bearable, morally as well as emotionally’, but it simultaneously functioned as the 
motor of violence as peer pressure made an opt-out extremely difficult.  
The growing interest in women and the Holocaust and in the social environment 
of perpetrators led to the scholarly ‘discovery’ of the female perpetrators – until then 
an almost completely neglected topic. The ‘feminist’ Historikerstreit (struggle 
amongst historians) over whether women were victims of an extreme male-dominated 
and sexist-racist Nazi dictatorship that reduced women to the status of mere ‘objects’ 
(Gisela Bock), or whether women played an active role in the regime and shared some 
responsibilities for the crimes (Claudia Koonz) constructed an over-simplistic 
perpetrator-versus-victim dichotomy.70 It is only more recently that studies about the 
personnel of perpetrator groups, in particular research about the ‘euthanasia’ killing 
and concentration camps, made visible the important and varied functions women 
fulfilled as perpetrators and bystanders in mass murder.71 Female doctors, nurses, 
midwifes and administrative assistants directly or indirectly participated in the killing 
of innocent people in the Nazi ‘euthanasia’ programme.72 Women worked as cooks, 
office personnel, nurses, laboratory assistants, doctors, and camp guards in women’s 
divisions in some of the best-known concentration camps, such as Auschwitz-
Birkenau, Majdanek, Bergen-Belsen, Mauthausen, Dachau, and Sachsenhausen, and 
in numerous women concentration camps, such as Ravensbrück, Moringen and 
Lichenberg. In total, around 10 percent of all camp guards, i.e. 3,500, were female. 
They participated in tormenting and torturing prisoners, and helped to select and 
murder victims. Female perpetrators pursued their work under no duress, regarded 
concentration camps as a normal place of work and the attached SS estate as a normal 
place to live in, and often perceived inmates as ‘sub-humans’ who had no right to live 
in the Nazi state. Gudrun Schwarz argued that SS-wives (240,000 women were 
married to SS men) were directly involved in the system of terror by providing 
domestic and emotional stability at the place of crime for the husbands, and by 
actively participating in the system of exploitation and robbing. Some wives of 
members of the SS or the Gestapo even volunteered to take part in encroachments and 
shootings.73 Overall, female perpetrators worked as efficiently and professionally as 
their male counterparts to ensure a smooth killing process. They were not passive 
tools in the apparatus of repression but used their freedom to pursue personal 
initiatives.  
Very recently an expert stated bluntly that ‘the full history of wartime 
collaboration in much of eastern Europe remains to be written.’74 However, 
scholarship has made considerable progress since the discourse about societies in 
Nazi-occupied territories hardly went beyond the description of stigmatized 
collaboration and heroic resistance. A discussion about the motives of non-German 
perpetrators exemplifies the complexities of the subject. Michael MacQueen argued 
that there were six basic motivations for, or types of, Lithuanian perpetrators:  
 
1. Revenge, by those who had suffered at the hands of the Soviets.  
2. Careerists, who sought personal advancement under the new regime. 
3. Turncoats, who attempted to expiate service to the Soviets by enthusiastic 
loyalty to their new masters. 
4. Greedy individuals, seeking to gain booty. 
5. Anti-Semites, who had baited the Jews before the war and participated in anti-
Jewish violence under the Nazis.  
6. So-called accidental perpetrators, who just happened to be recruited and 
went with the flow.75  
 Martin Dean, who studied the motivations of police volunteers in the killing in 
Belarus and the Ukraine, came independently to almost identical conclusions. He 
argued, however, that one could add the ‘sadistic types’ and ‘those who lusted for 
power’. Dean also believed that ‘usually a combination of several of these 
motivations played a role within each individual’. Furthermore, whilst anti-Semitism 
played an important motivation amongst some local policemen who participated in 
the killing, ‘it was more a matter of personal animosity for political or economic 
reasons’ and lacked the dehumanizing racial basis of Nazi ideology. MacQueen and 
Dean also stress the ‘gruesome intimacy of the killings’. Many of the perpetrators 
‘personally knew the victims and had lived together with them previously as 
schoolmates, co-workers, and neighbours.’ Hence local economic and personal 
relations played an important role. Dean concluded: ‘The active core was driven 
particularly by self-made careerists, the dynamic force of any society, who were 
particularly susceptible to the new opportunities and the disorientation of society’s 
moral compass created by Nazi rule.’    
Finally, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists and 
others, have shown sustained interest in topics dealing with violence, killing, mass 
murders, ethnic cleansing and genocide over the last two decades or so.76 Their 
‘multifaceted approaches and different “models” of explanation’ have stimulated and 
broadened the discourse on perpetrator studies of the Holocaust. Two main 
approaches have stood out amongst scholars who have tried to answer what motivates 
mass murder and genocide. Whilst one group insists that murderous events like 
genocide ‘have occurred throughout history in all parts of the world’, another group 
emphasises ‘change over continuity’, and, for instance, links modernity with genocide 
(those pursuing comparative genocide studies approach the Holocaust not as a 
‘unique’ event but as an extreme form of genocide). Some social psychologists have 
offered particularly innovative analyses. James Waller has developed a complex 
theory that looks at the interaction among dispositional, situational and social 
factors.77 He emphasises the importance of moral disengagement, a gradual process in 
which perpetrators distance themselves from the victims and become capable of 
producing extraordinary evil. This ‘culture of cruelty’ rewards individuals for 
violence against victims and is stimulated by professional socialisation, binding 
factors of the group, and the merger of role and person. Harald Welzer, in a study that 
bears great similarities to Waller’s findings, investigated the social psychological 
parameters, i.e. the moral concepts of the majority group in society, combined with a 
micro-study of the crime and the killing.78 He argued that most humans have the 
potential to turn into mass murderers. This happens through a process in which the 
majority group’s feeling of solidarity towards a minority has vanished and systematic 
killing is not regarded as a crime but is desired.  
 
Conclusions and future perspectives  
Our knowledge and understanding of the Holocaust, the instruments of terror and 
their personnel, have made enormous progress over the last decade.79 Perpetrator 
Studies has established itself as new discipline within the broad topic of National 
Socialism and has contributed towards many innovative findings.80 These studies aim 
to analyse the interaction between the structures of persecution, the bureaucracy of 
extermination, the (group) biography of perpetrators below the top Nazi leadership, 
the motivation of mass murderers beyond madness and racial hatred, the act of killing, 
and the time and place of killing. There were probably several hundred thousand 
Germans and Austrians who planned, organised, carried out and assisted persecution 
and murder. They were complemented by thousands of ethnic Germans 
(Volksdeutsche) who often pursued auxiliary functions, and hundreds of thousands of 
foreign auxiliaries.81 The forms of persecution and murder, and the motivation behind 
them, were extremely broad. Typical, however, was the mixture of state-prescribed 
and individually initiated violence – forms of violence which were difficult to 
separate and mutually conditional – through which they received their particular 
power and dynamics. The latest research suggests that there were at least three periods 
of political socialisation that shaped a ‘radicalising career’: the violent völkisch-Nazi 
milieu in post-war Weimar (climate of hate, racist prejudice and glorification of 
violence), the integration into Nazi organisations and an internalisation of violence 
during the Nazi dictatorship after 1933 (turning ‘pre-war extremists’ into ‘full-time 
Nazis’), and the terrorist milieu in the occupied territories after 1939 (cumulative 
radicalisation and violence with a de-inhibiting effect; socialisation in violent 
comradeship). Overall, research suggests that whilst disposition is more important 
among the ‘architects’ of genocide, the behaviour of the ‘shooters’ is more 
determined by situational factors. It is likely that the largest group of perpetrators only 
radicalised after 1939 into ‘wartime Nazis’. However, the social psychologist Leonard 
Newman reminds us of the enormous complexities involved at any level: Personal and 
situational factors  
 
interact in complicated ways … Situations do not only interact with 
dispositional factors to affect behaviour, they also shape and change those 
dispositions: people do not just react to situations … and finally, ‘situations’ 
themselves do not even objectively exist but need to be cognitively constructed 
by the people  they then go on to affect … While attitudes do indeed give rise to 
behavior, it is also the case that one’s behavior affects one’s attitudes and 
beliefs … The cognitive dissonance literature shows that when people are led to 
engage in behaviors that violate their normal standards, they will be motivated 
to change their attitudes and beliefs to reduce the discrepancy between their 
behaviour and their cognitions.82  
 
These and many other insights represent great achievements in Perpetrator Studies but 
cannot obscure the fact that the list of shortcomings, desiderata, and methodological 
problems remains daunting.83 The importance of racist ideology, and in particular 
anti-Semitism, in the mass murder has reoccupied centre stage but remains disputed. 
The core group of men who organised genocide were willing and committed 
ideologues. Furthermore, Christopher Browning now believes that the ‘significant 
minority’ of so-called ‘eager-killers’ amongst low-level perpetrators were 
ideologically motivated to kill Jews and not overtly influenced by 
‘situational/organization/institutional factors’.84 However, among the majority of 
killers it is impossible to establish a direct causal relation between fanatical anti-
Semitism and actually killing Jews. Even the most committed racist ideologues, 
including Wildt’s ‘generation of the unbound’, required a process of ‘cumulative 
radicalization’ ‘to the point where they could actually comprehend that the most 
extreme conclusions of their ideas were realizable.’85 Also, how exactly did moral 
scruples and human ethics disintegrate: was it, for example, a mixture of escalating 
pragmatism and social-Darwinist racism during a radicalising war? Or, did years of 
political and social indoctrination by the Nazis create a ‘new moral conscience’ that 
discarded universal human rights?86 Why did the mentality in the occupied territories 
(endemic corruption and violent excess, particularly in the East) differ so much from 
that of the old Reich (bureaucratic inhumanity and measures of persecution).87 
Furthermore, George Browder raises a number of crucial questions that remain 
unanswered:  
 
Were those who behave proactively at all levels ‘normal’ representatives of 
German society or a radicalized minority? Were all involved ‘normal’ 
representatives of Western industrial societies, individuals whom extraordinary 
circumstances and pressures had turned into perpetrators? … What made the 
difference for those who withdrew or even resisted?88 
 
And finally: how do humans live with murderous crimes? And how do perpetrators 
re-integrate themselves into society?  
There are also serious limitations and methodological problems. Whilst many 
experts see the most promising approach in biographical analyses (following 
Herbert’s study of Best), the biographical source base is often very limited 
(particularly for members of the lower classes), long-term personal dispositions often 
appear of only limited importance for the situational behaviour of a person, and 
perpetrators often acted collectively, in an environment of bureaucracy or 
comradeship, where their individual character disappeared. More generally, shortages 
of primary sources and inherent problems with existing sources put severe limits to 
our abilities to analyse the motivation of killers: e.g., the most prominent perpetrator 
analyses are based on witness statements and testaments from court trials (Browning, 
Goldhagen); most accounts on collaborators are based on oral testimonies from war 
crimes investigations; female camp guards hardly left any letters, diaries, personal 
notes or even post-war interrogations. Most perpetrator studies are based on 
predominantly German (Nazi) sources and do not take into consideration the 
perspectives of the victims of genocide and occupation.89 Furthermore, Jürgen 
Matthäus has warned that whilst more and more researchers have studied (and at 
times have become obsessed with) the personalities of perpetrators, their crimes and 
the crime locations, ‘the more we restrict our analysis to the incriminating act, the 
greater the risk of severing casual and chronological connections with other, no less 
relevant aspects of the past’.90 Finally, the call by some historians for multi-causal 
interpretations based on multi-disciplinary approaches has only been partially 
attempted. However, social psychological explanations which concentrate on group 
dynamics (but are often ahistorical – i.e., they neglect specific historical conditions 
and cultural factors, including ideology – and have a tendency to down-play the 
responsibility of perpetrators) can provide essential additions to historical attempts to 
find answers to why normal people became mass murderers under Nazism.91 
Other serious challenges remain. There are still hardly any attempts for a 
systematic gender perspective in Perpetrator Studies, and it is necessary to reflect 
anew about the methodologies of how to write women’s history under Nazism. It is 
not clear to what extent or whether at all the systematic investigations of their male 
counterparts are applicable to women. Susannah Heschel argues: ‘there is a widely 
shared assumption that men’s cruelty is, in part, an expression of masculinity, but no 
exploration into whether women’s  acts of cruelty are linked to expressions of their 
femininity, understanding both terms as social constructs.’92 There are also difficult 
pedagogical tasks. In Germany, the gap between historical knowledge and the 
willingness to confront the past in ones’ own immediate environment has not changed 
since Anna Rosmus became the ‘nasty girl’ of Passau for exploring Nazism in her 
home town in the early 1980s. In fact, there is a widespread acceptance throughout 
Western European societies today that Nazism was evil and collaboration was often as 
deadly, but, according to private family discourses, there were never any Nazis or 
Nazi sympathisers in ones’ own family. On the contrary, according to family 
memories the whole of Europe was full of heroic resistance fighters.93 The enormous 
reaction to the controversial book Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish 
Community in Jedwabne (Poland) from 2000/1 by the sociologist Jan Tomasz Gross 
exemplifies how difficult and sensitive the discussion of local collaboration in the 
Holocaust continues to be more than 60 years after the defeat of Nazism.94 More 
generally, knowledge of the mass murder during the Nazi dictatorship has become so 
complex and multilayered that it is hardly of any pedagogical use. 
Finally, several leading experts have called for a more holistic approach in 
Holocaust studies. This questions the predominant historiographical focus on the 
perpetrators and promises to give Perpetrator Studies an innovative momentum.95 
Peter Longerich expressed the need for a more comprehensive and understandable 
explanation of the events, for integrating perpetrator studies into the whole period 
between 1933 and 1945. He argues that the structuring of the debates in the form of 
the now classic dichotomies (was the decision to murder rooted in ‘predisposition’ or 
‘situation’? Were perpetrators driven by ‘utilitarian’ or ‘ideological’ motives? Was 
the murder driven locally or by the centre?) does not do justice to the complexities of 
the topic. Similarly, Saul Friedlander demands an ‘integrated history of the 
Holocaust’ that includes German activities; activities from authorities, institutes and 
various groups in societies in the occupied countries and satellite states; Jewish 
perceptions and reactions; and simultaneous description of events on all levels and at 
various places. This promises to enhance the perception of the scale, the complexity 
and mutual interweaving of the enormous number of components of the Holocaust. 
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